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THE MEANING OF FRACTURES: ORTHOPAEDICS
AND THE REFORM OF BRITISH HOSPITALS IN THE
INTER-WAR PERIOD
by
ROGER COOTER*
It is not immediately obvious that any history of the treatment of fractures could
significantly illuminate the development oftwentieth-century medicine. Could such a
history be much more than a chronicle oftherapeutic traditions, technical advances,
and forgotten pioneers? That would indeed be desolately dry-boned, even by the
standards of "internal" medical historiography.1
Butanysuchassumptionswould bewrong. Althoughthetreatmentoffractures was
never quite the social concern that tuberculosis and maternity were, it was a highly
significant issue in the politics ofmedicine and hospitals in inter-war Britain. In the
1930sespecially, theissuewasto link theleaders ofthemedical professionwith leaders
ofindustry, tradeunions, and local and national government. Increasingly, it drew the
attention of the British Medical Association (BMA), the Trades Union Congress
(TUC) and Labour Party, the Federation of British Industry, the London County
Council (LCC), and the Ministries ofHealth, Labour, and Pensions, alongwith many
other special-interest groups.
Forthefractureissue, then,nolessthanfortuberculosisandmaternity, thehistorian
must ask how and why its importance arose when it did. To attempt an answer is
necessarily to engage with the economic, social, and political history ofthe inter-war
decades;afterall,liketuberculosis,fractureshadlongbeenacommonsourceofsuffering
anddeathandofsevereandusuallyprolongedsocio-economicdeprivation. Moreover,
some ofthesame urgent arguments forremedial action thatwere to bedeployed in the
1920s and 1930s can be found from the middle of the nineteenth century.2
This paper examines the issue from the perspective ofthe professional interests and
aspirations oforthopaedic surgeons in the inter-warperiod. In large part, it was out of
the orthopaedists' ambition to gain control over fracture treatment, and so enlarge
theirprofessional space, that the issue came to acquire its importance in Britain.3 But
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I See, forexample, E. M. Bick, 'Fractures', inhis Sourcebookoforthopaedicsurgery, 2nded., Baltimore,
Md., Williams & Wilkins, 1948, ch. 10.
2 See,forexample,JohnRoberton,'Ontheneedofadditionalaswellasimprovedhospitalaccommodation
forsurgicalpatientsinmanufacturingandminingdistricts, butespecially inManchester', Trans. Manchester
Stat. Soc., 1860 (reprinted pamphlet).
3 IntheUnitedStates,orthopaedicsurgeonssecuredplacesinhospitalsanduniversitymedicalschoolsmuch
earlier than in Britain. Hence fractures neveracquired the sameprofessional significance. As early as 1907,
general surgeons at the Rochester General Hospital agreed to have all fractures assigned to theorthopaedic
service; hospitals in Boston and elsewhere followed suit after the 1914-18 war. (See J. Bone Jt Surg., 1955,
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this isnotthewholeofthe story, northemainreasonforitshistoricalimportance. The
fracture issue was integral to the shift in this century to a focus on accidents and
trauma-a shift offocuswithwidebutunderstudiedimplications.4Althoughthe First
World War "cast a halo" on trauma and brought the concern with it on to a par with
disease entities, the halo mightwell have slipped had it not been for the proponents of
fracture services during the interwar period.5 But because accidents and trauma cut
across the "organ geography" ofmedical and surgical specialties, the attempt to shift
the focus was to raise serious problems of conceptualization as well as of hospital
organization. As we shall see, it was in relation to these problems especially that the
efficient treatment offracturesbecamecentral to thepolitics ofBritishhospitalreform
before the Second World War.
WAR GAINS AND POST-WAR LOSSES
Thecommon beliefthat modern orthopaedics derives in large part from traditional
bone-setting appears to legitimate orthopaedic surgeons as the rightful menders of
broken bones.6 But, in fact, it was only through the First World War that
orthopaedists as a professional body brought the treatment of fractures within the
scope oftheir specialism.7 (Indeed, it was largely as a result ofthe wartime work with
fractures that professional association re-emerged and was made permanent.)
Hitherto, orthopaedics had been almost wholly concerned with the correction of
chronic deformities, especially among children. Although from the 1890s the
therapeutic techniques offracture treatment were increasingly the subject ofmedical
attention (leading to a BMA report in 1912),8 the practice offracture treatment had
37A: 383.) Unlike in Britain, however, where the majority offractures-as much as ninety-five per cent of
compound fractures-continued to be treated by general practitioners (J. Amer. Med Ass., 30 November
1940: 1855).
4 Forsomeoftheconceptualimplications,seeKarl Figlio:'Whatisanaccident?',inPaulWeindling(editor),
The socialhistory ofoccupationalhealth, London, Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 180-206; and idem, 'How does
illness mediate social relations? Workmen's compensation and medico-legal practices, 1890-1940', in
P. Wright and A. Treacher (editors), Theproblem ofmedicalknowledge, Edinburgh University Press, 1982,
pp. 174-224.
5 Thedescriptionofthewaras"castingahaloontrauma"wasgivenbySirHarryPlattinaninterviewwith
the author, 7 November 1984. For background on trauma, see C. T. Thompson, 'Trauma center
development', in J. S. Najarian and J. P. Delany (editors), Emergency surgery: trauma, shock, burns,
Chicago, Year Book Medical Publishers, 1982, pp. 15-20. The existing Committee on Trauma of the
American College ofSurgeons began life in 1922 as the Committee on Fractures; the Societ6 Internationale
de Chirurgie Orthopedique (established in 1929) added "et de Traumatologie" to its title in 1936. See
Franklin Martin, Fifty years of medicine and surgery, an autobiographical sketch, Chicago, Surgical
PublishingCo., 1934, pp. 349-350;and SirHarry Platt, 'Orthopaedicsincontinental Europe, 1900-1950', in
his Selectedpapers, Edinburgh, E. & S. Livingstone, 1963, pp. 65-88, at p. 66.
6See, for example, George Rosen, The specialization of medicine, New York, Froben Press, 1944,
pp. 10-11; Arthur Keith, Menders ofthe maimed, London, Frowde, 1919; and cf. Roger Cooter, 'Bones of
contention?Orthodox medicineand the mystery ofthe bone-setter'scraft', in W. F. Bynum and R. S. Porter
(editors), Medicalfringe and medical orthodoxy, London, Croom Helm, 1986, pp. 158-173.
7 RobertJones,whoasearlyas1896hadsuggestedtotheshort-livedBritishOrthopaedicSociety(est. 1894)
thatthey widen theirdomain to include fractures (Trans. B.O.S., 1896, 1:33), defined thespecialism in 1917
as "the treatment by manipulation, by operation, and by re-education, of disabilities of the locomotor
system, whetherarising from disease orinjury". 'Orthopaedic surgery in its relation to the war', Recalled to
life, 1917, 1: 50-59, at p. 51.
8 'British Medical Association Report ofthe Committee onTreatmentofSimpleFractures', Br. med. J.,
1912, ii: 1505-1541. The report was promoted by attention to the open-plating techniques of Arbuthnot
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remainedlargelyinthehandsofgeneralpractitionersandhospitalgeneral surgeons. The
only exception was the work ofRobert Jones in Liverpool, and thatwas conducted in a
private clinic (mostly forthetreatment ofindustrial injuries) established byhisuncle, the
general practitioner, Hugh Owen Thomas.9
How orthopaedists secured the treatment of fractures during the war through the
political and organizational genius of Robert Jones does not concern us here;10 more
important to note is that, after the war, orthopaedists were unable to carry over into
civilian hospital practice theirmilitarycontrol offractures, largely becauseofopposition
from old-guard general surgeons (especially in London). To these "reactionaries", as
Jones and his colleagues referred to them, orthopaedics appeared the most conspicuous
ofseveral insurgent specialisms threatening completely to outmode general surgery. By
1918, notonlyhadvastportionsofgeneral surgery been hived offinto seventeen specially
designated military orthopaediccentres (commanding over 25,000 beds)," and not only
had some two dozen ambitious disciples ofJones come together (in February 1918) to
formtheBritishOrthopaedicAssociation(BOA); butalsothespecialism hadacquiredan
exhaltedpublicimageasaresultoftherehabilitation ofdisabledsoldiers. Jones'swartime
"headquarters"-the Shepherd's Bush Military Orthopaedic Hospital in London-had
become a national symbol of the success of wartime medicine.
The "old guard" were also well aware that orthopaedics in Jones's hands represented
certain anti-traditional anddistinctly unpleasantAmerican tendencies.12 Before the war,
Jones, alongwith otheroutstanding British surgeons, had been amember ofSir Berkeley
Moynihan's Provincial Surgeons' Association, a visibly modernist group deeply
influenced by American surgery and the "scientific" hospital organization that had
emerged inAmerica during the Progressive Era.'3 It was thosewithin or identifying with
Lane at Guy's Hospital, and by attention to the radically conservative fracture treatment of
J. Lucas-Championniere in France. The report prompted Robert Jones, 'On the present position of
treatment of fractures', ibid., 1912, ii: 1589-1594; and idem., 'An orthopaedic view of the treatment of
fractures', Amer. J. Orthop. Surg., 1913, 11: repr. in E. M. Bick (editor), Classics in orthopaedics,
Philadelphia, J. P. Lippincott, 1976, pp. 348-360-the first systematic account of the treatment offractures
to bear the word "orthopaedics" in its title.
9See Frederick Watson, The life ofSir RobertJones, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1934; and David Le
Vay, The life ofHugh Owen Thomas, Edinburgh, E. & S. Livingstone, 1956.
For fuller discussion ofthe orthopaedists' involvement with the war, as well as their involvement with
crippled children, industry, and organized labour and other areas referred to here only in passing, see my
forthcoming book on the social history of orthopaedics.
II According to the ArmyCouncil Instruction (A.C.I 72, 1916) devised byJones, thefollowing were to be
sent to the military orthopaedic hospitals: (I) cases ofplastic surgery of face, neck andjaw; (2) any case of
deformity or disability ofthe feet; (3) any case ofmal-united fracture or un-united fracture; (4) any case of
fracture of the femur; (5) any case of derangement or disability ofjoints; (6) any case requiring a special
surgical appliance; (7) any case of nerve lesion requiring treatment. Cited in the report of the Orthopaedic
Committee ofthe Royal College ofSurgeons, 4 July 1918, in MS Committeefor Temporary Purposes, vol.. 6,
1907-22, pp. 312-315, Royal College of Surgeons.
12ThesignificanceoforthopaedicsfortheoldguardinBritainwassimilartothesignificanceofgynaecology
for American general surgeons during the Progressive Era. This comparison was explicitly used to promote
orthopaedic specialization by a disciple of Jones, W. Rowley Bristow, in 'Discussion on the treatment of
fractures', Br. med J., 1925, ii: 317-331, at p. 331. On the old guard's distaste for things American in
medicine, see Charles Macalister, The origin and history of the Liverpool Royal Hospital, with personal
reminiscences, Liverpool, W. B. Jones, 1936, p. 57ff.
13 See Platt, 'Moynihan; the education and training ofthe surgeon', in his Selectedpapers, op. cit., note 5
above, pp. 159-169; and idem., 'The foundation of the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and
Ireland', Br. J. Surg., 1982, 69: 561-563.
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this reformist elite, most of whom (including Jones) had close personal and
professional links with the Mayo brothers, who established the British Journal of
Surgery in 1913,14 and who, through the contingencies of the war and largely at the
expense ofthe old-guard London surgeons, secured for themselves positions ofpower
in the Army Medical Advisory Council under the reform-minded Director-General of
the Army Medical Services, Sir Alfred Keogh. Several ofthe more politically active in
this group, among them Harold Stiles of Edinburgh, Henry Gray of London, John
Lynn-Thomas ofCardiff, ErnestHeyGrovesofBristol,WilliamdeCourcyWheelerof
Dublin, and, latterly, Harry Platt ofManchester, came to be directly involved in the
wartime organization oforthopaedics, as did several leading American orthopaedists.
It is not, therefore, difficult to credit the rumour that when Keogh appointed Jones
Director of Military Orthopaedics in 1916, senior members of the Royal College of
Surgeons petitioned their president to have the appointment rescinded. It is a fact, at
any rate, that immediately after the war a committee of the council of the College
sought tocircumscribe orthopaedics, regardingwith "mistrustanddisapprobation the
movementinprogress toremovethetreatmentofconditions alwaysproperlyregarded
as themainportion ofthegeneral surgeon's workfromhishands, andplaceitin those
of 'Orthopaedic specialists' '.15
Thus, inlargepartbecauseoftheirprofessionalachievementsunderJonesduringthe
war, orthopaedists found their post-war path obstructed. Moreover, while the
teaching hospital establishment had no intention of "letting in" orthopaedists, the
militaryorthopaedicscentreswerereturnedtotheirpre-waruses. TheShepherd's Bush
Hospital, for example, despite efforts by Jones to turn it into a postgraduate
orthopaedic teachingcentre, was repossessed bythe Hammersmith Guardians in 1924
and restored as a Poor House and Infirmary. Quite literally in many cases, the
"modernists" in orthopaedics were forced out into the country, there to be involved
with open-air hospitals forcrippled children, dealing mainly with cases ofrickets and
tuberculosis ofthe bones andjoints. A decade after the war, no less than fifty-four of
the by then ninety-four senior members of the BOA had resident or consultancy
positions attheseandotherchildren'shospitals (sixteenofthemholdingmorethanone
such appointment), as did forty-two of the sixty-seven junior or "associate"
members. Although this area of their work cannot be gone into here, it is worth
pointing out that the "national scheme" for the orthopaedic care ofcrippled children
that Jones and his colleagues devised in 1919, and to which they were more or less
compelled to devote their post-war energies, had largely met with success by the late
1920s, when sometwodozen orsopukkaorthopaedic hospitals had been broughtinto
14 See Donald Bateman, BerkeleyMoynihan, surgeon, London, Macmillan, 1940; Martin, op. cit., note 5
above; Helen B. Clapesattle, The Mayo brothers, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1962; and William Mayo,
'Present-day surgery in England and Scotland, from notes made on a recent short visit', reprint from J.
Minnesota State Med. Assn. and Northwestern Lancet, 1 December 1907.
15 Reportofthe RCSOrthopaedicCommittee,4July 1918,op.cit.,note 11 above,p. 313.Ontherumour,see
Platt, 'Moynihan', op. cit., note 11 above, p. 163; and T. B. Layton, Sir William Arbuthnot Lane, an enquiry
into the mindandinfluence ofa surgeon, Edinburgh, E. & S. Livingstone, 1956, p. 109. For the reaction of
general surgeonsinAmerica tothewartimegainsoforthopaedics, seeG. Gritzerand A. Arluke, Themaking
ofrehabilitation; apoliticaleconomy ofmedicalspecialization, 1890-1980, Berkeley, University ofCalifornia
Press, 1985, p. 44ff.
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existence along with countless orthopaedic clinics.16 For the most part, it was in the
wake ofthis accomplishment, made outside themajorcentres ofBritishmedicine, that
orthopaedists came to concentrate on the issue of fractures-the planning,
organization, and rhetoric for which to some extent overlapped.
THE PILOT FRACTURE CLINIC
Tothegeneral picture ofthe failure oforthopaedic surgeons to secure thecontrol of
fracture treatment in the immediate post-warperiod there were, however, two notable
exceptions-the work of Meurice Sinclair, conducted at the St James Poor Law
Hospital, Balham, London, and that of Harry Platt at the Ancoats Hospital,
Manchester. Sinclair'sworkderiveddirectlyfromhispre-eminentwartimehandlingof
fractures atabasehospital in France, and itwas to haveconsiderable bearing on LCC
thinking on fracture services in the 1930s. But it was little noticed before then, neither
was Sinclair a member of the BOA until 1935, though he regarded himself as
professionally indebted to Jones.17 Platt, by contrast, was a founder member of the
BOA, and his work at Ancoats was intended from the start as a demonstration of
orthopaedic specialization. In this, as in much ofhis other work, Platt was greatly
influenced both by Jones and by American models.
After graduating in medicine at Manchester in 191 1, Platt had gone to London to
"round off" hiseducation bygainingexperience at the specialist hospitals ofStPeter's
(genito-urinary), St. Mark's(colo-rectal),andtheRoyalNationalOrthopaedic.18Platt
was not at this time seeking to become a specialist, but while he was at the RNOH in
1913, he was invited by the head of the Orthopaedic Service of the Massachusetts
General Hospital to further his training in Boston. The experience was decisive; the
MGH,withtheBostonChildren'sHospitalandHarvard Medical School,wasthenthe
world's leading centre for orthopaedics, embracing all that was most advanced in
American medicine. Platt's Orthopaedic surgery in Boston, written just before he
returned to Manchester in April 1914 to secure the appointment of honorary
16 SeeJonesandG. R.Girdlestone,'Thecureofcrippledchildren. Proposednationalscheme', Br.med.J.,
1919, ii: 457-460. On the orthopaedic hospitals, see Central Council for the Care ofCripples, Directoryfor
1935, London, 1935.
17 In 1937, the then twenty-bed orthopaedic unit at St James received no fewer than 735 in-patients for
fracture treatment. Sinclair was the consulting orthopaedic specialist and William Gissane (on whom see
below) was the senior assistant medical officer. According to Gissane, it was he who, in 1934, "introduced
modem methods offracture treatment to this hospital", but this would seem to have consisted mostly of
streamlining what Sinclair had already established. See the report on 'Orthopaedic after care, 1932-47',
Greater London Record Office[hereinafter GLRO]: PH/HOSP/1/66; seealso, 'BMA Report ofCommittee
on Fractures', Br. med. J., suppl., 16February 1935, 53-62 atp. 57. On Sinclair's 92-bed segregated fracture
service at No. 8 Stationary Hospital, Wimereux, France, see Robert Jones, 'Introduction' to Sinclair,
Fractures, London, Constable, 1931, pp. xxxiii-iv; and Harvey Cushing, From a surgeon's journal,
1915-1918, London, Constable, 1936, entry for 4 June 1917, p. 113.
18 Biographical information on Platt comes from the appreciations by H. Osmond-Clarke and others in
Platt'sbirthdayvolume oftheJ. BoneJtSurg., 1966,48B:613-622; variousincidental lecturesand addresses
by Platt (mostly unpublished); and several interviews conducted by myself and others between 1974 and
1985. See also the introduction to Stella Butler, 'A handlist for the papers of Sir Harry Platt', typescript,
1984. On the RNOH see J. A. Cholmeley, Thehistory ofthe RoyalNationalOrthopaedic Hospital, London,
Chapman & Hall, 1985; on St Peter's see A. Clifford Morson (editor), St. Peter's Hospitalfor Stone,
1860-1960, E. & S. Livingstone, 1960; and on St Mark's, see Lindsay Granshaw, St. Mark's Hospital,
London: the social history ofa specialist hospital, London, King's Fund, 1985.
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consultant surgeon to the Ancoats Hospital, well illustrates his enthusiasm for
Bostonianorthopaedics andfortheorganization andthrustofAmericanmedicineand
surgery in general.19 It was an enthusiasm not easy to lose.
The Ancoats Hospital was only a small voluntary hospital-a typical place for a
juniorappointment-butinmanywaysitwasideally suited to asurgeonwithbudding
orthopaedic interests. For one thing, both ofthe other surgeons, John Morley (later
Professor ofSurgery at Manchester University) and W. R. Douglas (later a renowned
cancer surgeon at Manchester's Christie Hospital) were also young, ambitious and
willing to try out new ideas and techniques. For another, the situation ofthe hospital,
in one ofManchester's densest industrial districts, rendered it essentially an accident
hospital with a large turnover offracture cases.20 Finally, and not least, the hospital
had a relatively liberal board of managers.
Here, then, was apropitious settinginwhich to try outAmerican-style reforms, and
within months ofhis appointment, Platt was conspiring with Morley and Douglas to
dojust that. Instead ofeach taking all the cases admitted during a period ofduty, the
three colleagues divided cases (and the seventy-five beds) according to surgical
specialities. By this means, Platt was able to establish a uniformity of therapeutic
control over all the incoming fracture (and other orthopaedic) cases.2'
None ofthis brought rebuke from the lay managers ofAncoats, though when Platt
was appointed he had had to promise not to indulge only in specialist work. Since the
specialization he was proposing could be seen as meeting the needs of the public-
especially the needs of the locality's industrial workers, who were also (through
workers' contribution schemes and the Hospital Saturday Fund) an increasingly
important sourceofhospital funding-the laygovernorshadnoreason tofearthatthe
specialization would serve only professional interests.22 It may have been important,
too, that the governors could see the specialization as emerging from the co-operative
efforts oftheir own consultants, rather than as something imposed from outside and
challenging their autonomy. The secretary ofthe hospital, far from expressing worry
over the new division of labour, was apparently more concerned about the effect of
orthopaedic specialization on Platt's own financial future, since, as everyone knew,
fractures, no less than chronic musculo-skeletal deformities, were primarily the lot of
the poor and therefore held out little promise for remunerative private practice-the
19 'Orthopaedic surgery in Boston', Medical Chronicle, March 1914, 58:473-479. See also MorrisVogel,
The invention of the modern hospital: Boston, 1870-1930, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985,
pp. 63-65; and Clement A. Smith, The Children's Hospital ofBoston, Boston, Little, Brown, 1983, ch. 12:
20Theaveragewasthirtynewfracturecasesaweek:Platt,'Ontheorganisationofafractureservice', Lancet,
1921,11: 620-621, repr. inPlatt, Selectedpapers, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 1-5. On theAncoats Hospital, see
John Pickstone, Medicine and industrial society: a history ofhospital development in Manchester and its
region, 1752-1946, Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 145-146 et passim.
21 Foranexampleofthetraditional routine(atGuy'sHospital) seeLayton, op.cit., note 15above,pp. 21,
73; forearlier, at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, (where "the dresser takes all the Fracture casesetc."), see the
letter ofJames Taylor quoted in John West, The TaylorsofLancashire: bonesetters anddoctors, 1750-1890,
Worsley, H. Duffy, 1977, pp. 66-67.
22 On the importance of workers' contributions see anon., History of Ancoats Hospital, 1873-1900,
[Manchester, n.p., n.d.], p. 34; and (Cave), Interim Report ofthe Voluntary HospitalCommittee, 1921, Cmd.
1206. On the growing fear among the lay trustees ofhospitals over the professionalizing ambitions oftheir
medical staffs, see David Rosner, A oncecharitable enterprise: hospitals andhealth care in Brooklyn andNew
York 1885-1915, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 10ff.
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main benefit from honorary hospital appointments.23 This financial aspect may also
help to explain the willingness of Morley and Douglas to comply with Platt's
reformism, as may the fact that fractures, when not regarded simply as an
unchallengingareaofmedicine, wereseenasprofessionallyrisky-acaseofmal-union
having the potential to ruin a surgeon's reputation.24
The strategic potential for rising specialisms in the smaller hospitals (at least in the
Manchester region) was also illustrated at the Salford Royal Hospital, where Platt's
friend and wartime colleague, Geoffrey Jefferson, was allowed to concentrate on
neurosurgery.25 Butit wasmuch moredifficultfororthopaedists to carve outspecialist
niches in the major teaching hospitals where their interests threatened the physical
territory (beds) and the confidence claims of general surgeons. In some London
hospitals,orthopaedicdepartmentswereestablishedfromjustbeforethewar. Butthese
were largely forchroniccases, ratherthan thevictims ofaccidents, and were underthe
control ofgeneral surgeons rather than aspiring specialist surgeons. In fact (as we will
see below), one ofthe staunchest opponents ofthe orthopaedic specialists in the 1920s
was George E. Gask, who in the 1900s had himself been Chief Assistant to the
Orthopaedic Department at St Bartholomew's Hospital.26
During World War I, Platt was deeply involved with Manchester's military
orthopaediccentreatGrangethorpe; hisplansforAncoatsweredelayedalittle, buthis
experience was enlarged and his commitment to "progressive orthopaedics"
strengthened.27 After the war, between 1919 and 1921, Platt was able to establish the
world's first segregated fracture service under the control ofan orthopaedic surgeon.
He carried over into civilian practice the main wartime lessons of effective fracture
treatment: segregation, expert supervision, team-work, continuity of treatment, and
appropriateafter-care. Tothesefeaturesheaddeddetailedrecord-keepingonthesocial
and medical condition ofpatients, a technique he had learned in Boston and which,
applied generally, was basic to the scientific management of American hospitals.28
23 Platt, typescript ofinterviewwith Stella Butler, 6November 1981.Though Plattaspired andeventually
succeeded in following Robert Jones in building up a lucrative private practice in orthopaedics among the
upper classes (a possibility for no more than one or two orthopaedists in any major urban centre outside
London), initially he derived income by performing the occasional appendectomy, conducting coroner's
post-mortems, assisting private surgeons, medical coaching, and by writing medico-legal reports. The
financial disincentive to specializing inhospital fracture work was the reasonwhy Platt and hisorthopaedic
colleagues came to endorse a salaried service for hospital consultants (see below).
24 Wellknownwasthewarningofmedicallecturers: "Paygreatattention toyourfracturecases,withthem
alone the grave does not cover your mistakes." Quoted in Layton, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 73.
25 OntheSalfordRoyal,seePickstone,op.cit.,note20above,p. 145;onJefferson(whowasamemberofthe
BOA from the early 1920s, and who opened the discussion on 'Fractures ofthe spine' at the orthopaedic
meetingatthe Royal SocietyofMedicine in 1927[Br.med.J., ii: 1152-1153]), seehisobituary in Br. J. Surg.,
1961, 48: 586-588, and Biogr. Mem. Fellows R. Soc., 1961, 7: 127-131.
26J.L.Thornton,'OrthopaedicsurgeonsatSt.Bartholomew'sHospital, London',StBarts.Hosp.J., 1955,
59: 195-204, at p. 200.
27 See P. Gray, 'Grangethorpe Hospital Rusholme, 1917-1929', Trans. Lancs. & Ches. Antiquarian Soc.,
1975, 78: 51-64. On the orthopaedic lessons of the war, see Jones, op. cit., note 7 above; S. M. Smith,
'Fractures ofthe lower extremity', in W. G. Macpherson, et. al., (editors), Medicalservices in thehistory of
theGreat War:surgeryofthe war, vol. 2, London, HMSO, 1922, pp. 339-380, at p. 353; and G. M. Levick et
al., 'Organisation for orthopaedic treatment of War injuries', ibid., pp. 381-408.
28 Ontheprofoundsignificanceofrecord-keepinginthereformofAmericanhospitals, seeRosner,op.cit.,
note22above, p. 55 etpassim. On thehistory ofrecord-keeping (largely aspioneered at the MGH), see S. J.
Reiser, 'Creating form out of mass: the development of the medical record', in E. Mendelsohn (editor),
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Thesewere theessential principles ofthe "ideal fracture service" which Plattreported in
theLancetin 1921; theywere tobereiterated in thebarrage ofpapers and lecturesissued
byorthopaedistsfromthemid-1920s tothe 1940s;andtheyweretoreceivethebackingof
the medical establishment in the BMA's highly influential 'Report on fractures' (1935).
Directly as a result ofthis report, a motion was passed in the Commons in April 1936
which led to the setting-up ofthe government's Inter-Departmental Committee on the
Rehabilitation ofPersons Injured byAccidents, underthechairmanship ofSirMalcolm
Delevigne. ThroughDelevigne's InterimandFinalreports of1937and 1939respectively,
official endorsement was given to the principles first implemented by Platt.29
CAMPAIGNING FOR THE CAUSE
The long interval between the establishment ofthe fracture clinic at Ancoats and the
publication oftheabove reports strongly suggests thatexample alone was not sufficient
to make the treatment offractures a public issue. Norwould it be right tomaintain that
consciousness was raised merely by the rhetoric ofzealous orthopaedists. Nevertheless,
the rhetoric of the few, but influential, orthopaedists to whom this paper refers, was
all-important, for it was largely on the basis of their claims about the opposition to
segregated fracture treatment (more so than by any extolling of new technologies or
esotericoperativetechniquesandskills),thatthecampaignfortheorthopaediccontrolof
fractures wasconducted. Platt's recollection is illuminatingin this respect: "In the years
between the wars the field oforthopaedics was to those ofus then young an expanding
universe, and we fought the battle for the control of fractures with gusto.... Our
opponents oftenaccusedusofadoptingtheattitudeoftheGermanphilosopherNietzche
[sic]-'thatagoodfightsanctifiesacause'.,"30Thuscast,thefracturecausewasmorethan
merelythebidofaspecialistgroupforhospitalspace;itwasrecognizablyapartofawider
movement against the obstacles to reform in British hospital medicine.
Among the more important of the battles for the control of fractures was that
precipitated by RobertJones through a published lecture delivered in Liverpool in May
1925.31 Regarded byfriendandfoealikeasa "slashingattack onthe'Methodsbywhich
fractures aredealtwith at the bigteachinghospitals' ", Jones's lecture had, in fact, been
encouraged by Platt and his close companion, W. Rowley Bristow of St Thomas'
Hospital,whowaslargelyresponsibleforspearheading"theattackontheidealogical[sic]
barricades of the London teaching hospitals".32
Transformation and tradition in the sciences: essays in honor of . Bernard Cohen, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1984, pp. 301-316. "Team work" signified more than the obvious co-operation of
physiotherapists, electrotherapists, plaster sisters, etc. To use the concept was to question the necessity of
competition (either between surgeons, [cf. below notes 90, 97], or between hospitals) for progress in
medicine.
29 ForPlatt'sarticleseenote20above,andfortheBMA Reportseenote 17above. Onthesettingupofthe
Delevigne committee, see Public Record Office (hereinafter PRO): ED/50/173, and for discussion of the
reports see the last section of this paper.
30 'British Orthopaedic Association: first founders' lecture', J. BoneJt Surg., 1959,41B: 231-236, repr. in
Platt, Selectedpapers, (note 5 above), pp. 116-125 at p. 124.
31 'LadyJones'lectureoncripplingduetofractures: itspreventionandremedy',Br.med.J., 1925,i:909-913.
32 Platt, op. cit., note 30 above, p. 124; and see Bristow's attack on the London teaching hospitals in his
'The influence ofwar surgery on treatment offractures in Great Britain', J. Amer. Med. Ass., 3 December
1927: 1920-1924.
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Jonesopened hislecturewiththeobservation thattheexisting treatmentoffractures
was "a blot upon our surgical escutcheon". He decried as "hopelessly wrong" the
situation existing in "the big teaching hospitals" where out-patient ambulatory
fractures were treated by impermanent and unsupervisedjunior medical officers, and
where in-patient fractures-ostensibly of little interest to honorary surgeons who
resented them for blocking beds-were left to the care ofhouse surgeons whose job
consisted simply ofputting up the fractures in plaster and sending patients out at the
first opportunity-"Amoreunscientific andcertainlyless satisfactorymethod itis not
easy to conceive".33 And he portrayed "as even more pathetic" the fate of those
fracture cases sent to Poor Law infirmaries that were totally unfitted for the modern
treatment of fractures. Yet (and this was typical of most of his fellow-advocates of
fracture clinics), Jones had few statistics to offer as evidence for the general surgeons'
"old bad way" oftreating fractures. Indeed, their badness, he maintained, "[did] not
admit of argument". Nor did he anywhere make the claim for specialized fracture
treatment on the basis oforthopaedic access to new techniques or skills-he himself
was never more than a weak advocate of the open-plating of fractures-nor did he
extol the benefits ofX-rays, though he was a pioneer in their use.34 Convinced that
betterfunctional results in fracture treatmentwouldcomefromtheirbeinghandled by
properlytrainedexperts, hecouldreferonlytotheprinciplesofcareworkedoutduring
the war, which had resulted in a reputed twenty per cent reduction in mortality from
fractures.
Such rhetoric did more than merely represent fractures as amajor surgical problem
to be solved by hospital fracture clinics like Platt's at Ancoats. Knowing that his
demand for "efficient" fracture services would be seen as the call for the entry of
orthopaedicspecialistsintothemajorhospitals, andhenceasanassaultonconvention,
Jones pulled out every stop to legitimate exactly that. Claiming that what he was
suggesting was "neitherdifficult in conception norrevolutionary to bringinto effect",
he made li11ght of"the natural inclination on the part ofthe general surgeon to resist
what he fears to be an encroachment ofspecialism", arguing that this fearwas a thing
ofthe past and thatgeneral surgeons were, for avariety ofreasons, only too willing to
hand over their fracture cases: "The average hospital surgeon takes neither pride nor
scientificinterest inthetreatmentoffractures. Heknowsithimself, hishouse-surgeons
know it, and so do the students. Wherein and with whom lies an advantage? No! it is
not a mere matter of the encroachment of specialism, but a call to our sense of
proportion and sense ofduty. Whether we use the term 'specialism' or not, there is no
mind so comprehensive that it can keep pace with all the requirements of modern
surgery."
33 Jones,op.cit., note31 above, p. 910.Thecomplaintaboutfractures treatedbyunqualifiedpersonswas
not new; it was linked to the late-nineteenth-century campaign for the reform ofout-patients' departments.
See, for example, Br. med. J., 1874, i: 777-778. Likewise, with the need for "continuity oftreatment", the
CityOrthopaedic Hospital, London, was priding itselfon thispractice asearly as 1905: see Annual Report,
p. 12.
34 Forhisviewsonopen-plating, seethesourcesinnote8above,andontheuseofX-rays,seehiscomments
in Br. med. J., 1912, ii: 1594, and 1925, ii: 319. For his role in the introduction of X-rays in Britain, see
Watson, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 87-88. The radiologist James F. Brailsford dedicated to Jones his The
radiology ofbones andjoints, London, Churchill, 1934.
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Withregardtotheintroductionoforthopaedicsintothe"alreadytooovercrowded"
medicalcurriculum (and hence orthopaedistsintotheteachinghospitals), Jonessubtly
side-stepped the issue by arguing in general for the benefits of a reformed teaching
structure that would simplify and clarify instruction and make it more efficient.
Perhaps recalling his own training under the guidance ofhis uncle, Jones argued for
intensive trainingunderexperts, and (in factechoingalate-nineteenth-centurydebate)
extolled the out-patients' department as affording students "a better equipment in
after-life than academic lectures, the matterofwhich they can equally well glean from
textbooks."35 Since much ofhis own work had been conducted in a private accident
clinic, it is not surprising that he elevated the status ofthe hospital territory where the
vast majority of fracture cases were treated.
Finally, Jones endeavoured to nip criticism in the bud by appealing to the patient's
own best interests. To urge "that our hospitals are already too crowded", he said, "is
butpoorcomforttoayoungworkingmansentofftoaPoorLawinfirmary,withawife
and family dependent upon him. It is inefficient treatment and neglect which
transforms a simple fracture to a chronic deformity. It is far better for our hospital
authorities to say, 'We are not prepared to treat fractures,' than that they should take
on responsibilities which they cannot meet.... We cannot disguise the fact that great
numbers of adult cripples are manufactured by want of adequate provision."
It was this "plain speaking", asJones himselfcalled it, whiledisclaiming "any spirit
ofhostility", that set the stage for the expected confrontation. This took place at the
BMA meeting in Bath in August 1925 during a special session on 'Surgery and
Orthopaedics' in which the discussion was on the treatment offractures.36 It was here
that George Gask made his debut as the defender of generalism over surgical
specialism. How Gaskcameto open theproceedings is notclear; itisknown, however,
that Platt and Bristow helped ensure that the session was chaired by Moynihan (an
honorary member of the BOA), and that there was an illustrious audience of
orthopaedists (some from as far afield as Boston and the Mayo Clinic).37
35 Jones, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 913. Aspects of the late-nineteenth-century debate are touched on
in Third Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Metropolitan Hospitals, together
with ... Minutes ofEvidence, 1891, Cmd. 457, p. 34. Hospital out-patient departments were typically places
where there was more scope for medical interests over those ofhospital governors, and wherejunior medics
and aspiring specialists could begin to establish themselves: see Adrian Forty, 'The modern hospital in
England and France: thesocial andmedical usesofarchitecture', inAnthony D. King(editor), Buildingsand
society, London, Routledge, 1980, pp. 61-93 at pp. 76-77; see also 'The reform ofthe hospital out-patient
department', Br. med. J., 1913, i: 403-404.
36 'Discussion onthetreatment offractures: withspecial reference to itsorganization and teaching', ibid.,
1925, ii: 317-331.
37 Among the Americans present was Robert Osgood, the close friend ofJones and Platt who, in 1922,
became Chief of the Orthopaedic Service at Boston Children's Hospital and Professor of Orthopaedic
Surgery at Harvard Medical School. In 1921, Osgood had organized atwo-day conference on the treatment
offracturesat theMGH, which succeeded inbringingtogether overfifty general surgeons andorthopaedists
(see obituary ofOsgood, J. BoneJt Surg., 1957, 39A: 726-733). From theOrthopaedic Service ofthe Mayo
Clinic (est. 1912) came Melvin Henderson, a general surgeon who, in 1911, had been sent by the Mayo
brothers to trainunderJones in Liverpool and under Harold Stiles in Edinburgh (see Sketchofthehistoryof
the Mayo Clinic and the Mayo Foundation, Philadelphia, Mayo Clinic, Division of Publications, 1926,
pp. 42-43). From the Montreal General Hospital (where a fracture service had been established in 1919)
came A. T. Bazin.
The discussion at Bath appears to have prompted the questionnaire sent out by the American
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Though Gask (by this time the Director of the Professional Surgical Unit at St
Bartholomew's Hospital) washardlyaconventional opponent ofspecialization, itwas
almost impossible for him to emerge from the proceedings at Bath as other than a
"quixotic [defender] .. . of a losing cause".38 If this indeed was the "role" that the
organizers ofthe meeting intended for him, he filled it admirably, for by deprecating
the "artificial and totally unnecessary separation between surgery and medicine" as
"the greatest blow the profession ever sustained", he presented himself as a
backward-looking "romantic" radically at odds with the reformist "scientific"
outlook of the orthopaedists.39 To the modernists in orthopaedics who imagined
"progress" inexplicitly Spencerian terms ofgreaterefficiencythrough greater division
oflabour,40 Gask could only retort that the extended division oflabour which served
the needs of the munitions factory hardly applied best to the manufacture of good
general practitioners. But for the orthopaedists, the education ofgeneral practitioners
(for which Gask mostly spoke) was neither here nor there; they linked the appalling
(albeitmeagre) statistics on bad fracture treatment in Britain with the fact, made clear
at themeeting, "that probably one halfofthe fractures in this country were treated at
home or in cottage hospitals by general practitioners", and concluded that fractures
needed to be treated under their own expert supervision.4'
The incompetence of general practitioners was to become a larger part of
orthopaedicrhetoricinthe 1930s, thoughitwasnevertomovetocentrestage(norwere
there ever to be statistics on either the extent ofthe treatment offractures by general
practitioners or on their clinical results). So far as one can tell, general practitioners
orthopaedist, JohnPrentiss Lord, inwhichevidencewassought forthemeritsofhospital fracture services in
the hands of orthopaedists. Lord's highly favourable findings constituted the basis of his address to the
sectionoforthopaedic surgeryoftheAMAin 1927,which, inturn, was thebasis fortheeditorial on fracture
treatment in the Br. med. J.. See Lord, 'Factors in the advancement oforthopaedic surgery', J. Amer. Med.
Ass., 27 August 1927, 651-654; and 'The treatment of fractures', Br. med. J., 1927, ii: 695.
38 Platt in the 'Discussion on fractures', op. cit., note 36 above, p. 325.
39 Gask, ibid., p. 318. Gask's point ofreference was Sir T. Clifford Allbutt's The historical relations of
medicineandsurgery, London, Macmillan, 1905. ThoughGaskemergedpoorly from themeeting at Bath, he
wasnotarepresentativeoftheoldguardgeneral surgeons. Hesucceeded Moynihanaschairmanofthe Br. J.
Surg.; and although he was probably partly responsible for St Bartholomew's Hospital not having a fully
segregated fracture serviceuntilafter the Second World War, in the 1930s, he took his staffto visit Reginald
Watson-Jones' orthopaedic unit (and foremost fracture service) at the Liverpool Royal Infirmary. See
Geoffrey Keynes, The gates ofmemory, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 264 (Keynes was Gask's chief
assistant). See also the entry on Gask in the Dictionary ofNationalBiography. Gask's outlook has much in
common with the turn-of-the-century physicians described by Christopher Lawrence in 'Incommunicable
knowledge: science, technologyandtheclinicalartin Britain 1850-1914',J. contemp. Hist., 1985,20:503-20,
esp. at p. 512; and idem., 'Moderns and ancients: the "new cardiology" in Britain 1880-1930', Med. Hist.,
Suplgl. No. 5, 1985, pp. 1-33, esp. at p. 8.
See, forexample, Melvin Henderson, 'Leadership in orthopaedic surgery', J. Bone Jt Surg., 1934, 16:
495-498.
41 W. McAdam Eccles, in the 'Discussion on fractures', op. cit., note 36 above, p. 329. The 1912 BMA
'Report on fractures', op. cit., note 8 above, revealed that over one-third ofall simple fractures treated in
Britain(mostlyinhospitals) resulted inmalunionand/orpoorfunctional results. At the sametimeasseeking
to take fractures out ofthe hands ofgeneral practitioners, orthopaedists produced primers for them which
stressed the legal risks and the hostile public reaction to maltreatment: e.g., C. Max Page and W. Rowley
Bristow, The treatment offractures in generalpractice, London, Oxford Medical Publications, 1923; and
W. H. Ogilvie, Treatment offractures ingeneralpractice, 2vols., London, J. Bale, 1932. Sinceorthopaedists
relied on general practitioners to refer crippled children to theirclinics, there was reason not to antagonize
them.
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(unlike some hospital general surgeons) did not feel threatened by the advent of
fracture specialists,42 nor had most ofthem much reason to be, since to refer a patient
toaspecialist ortoaspecialhospitaldepartmentwasnottolosethatpatientfromone's
"panel" list or to forfeit National Insurance remuneration. Orthopaedists, for their
part, thus had little reason not to continue to regard the consultant opponents of
specialization as themain targets oftheirrhetoric. However, afterthemeetingat Bath,
they tended to keep offthe issues ofspecialization and educationper se, and to focus
instead on what they rightly regarded as virtually "unassailable" by anyone: the
practical means to achieving the best possible functional results in the treatment of
fractures. This was how Jones pitched his reply to Gask, and, by 1928, when the
budding proponent offracture services, Ernest Hey Groves, delivered his presidential
address to the BOA 'On the Treatment of Fractures', it was above all this less
contentious, practical side ofthe issue that was emphasized as "the problem".43 The
solution to theproblem, itwasincreasingly stressed, was "not newknowledge"-least
ofall newtechnologyornewresearchintomethods fortheinternal orexternal fixation
of fractures-but merely "the organized application of the knowledge we already
possess", namely, the "segregation of cases, the training of team workers, and the
systematic tabulation ofresults". Left unspoken were thepolitical implications ofthis
application ofknowledge from the point ofview ofthe organization and structure of
British hospitals. Leftunspoken, too, it should beadded, was theshrinkingmarket for
orthopaedists consequent upon the success of the orthopaedic scheme for crippled
children combined with the declining incidence ofrickets and "surgical tuberculosis"
of the bone and joints.44
THE CAUSE IN CONTEXT
The debate at Bath is a good illustration of how specialization was negotiated in
post-war Britain. But far wider issues were also involved here. Close to the surface of
the debate, and in the fabric of its rhetoric, lay the pressing question of the health
services reform.
The early 1920s were, by and large, a period ofretrenchment in health care, but the
financial crisis that lay behind that retrenchment also provided an increasingly
compelling argument forfundamental change. Althoughin 1921 theCaveCommittee,
inits Reporton voluntary hospitals, mostly sought only to shore up theexisting system,
42 See editorials in the Practitioner, 1936, 137: 402-403, and the MedicalOfficer, 26 June 1937, 255. The
Lancet in its editorial on 'The fracture problem' (1935, i: 383-384) rightly criticized the BMA Report on
fractures for completely avoiding the question of "the function of the GP in his duty to his middle-class
patients [sustaining fractures]". The criticism was never dealt with: see note 97 below.
43 Groves, 'Thetreatmentoffractures: aproblemoforganization', Br.med.J., 1928,ii:993-995. Groves's
stress on organization in fracture work is all the more impressive for his having previously undertaken
researchinto bone repairandopen operations; see his Onmodernmethodsoftreatingfractures, Bristol, John
Wright, 1916. For Jones's reply to Gask, see discussion at Bath, op. cit., note 36 above,
pp. 319-322.
44 Abundant evidence ofthis decline in the incidence ofrickets and tuberculosis ofthe bone andjoints is
contained in the proceedings of the 'Joint Conference, Invalid Children's Aid Association and Central
Committee for the Care ofCripples [Nov. 1926]', Cripples'J., 1927, 3: 162-291. Reflecting this decline is the
fall incasesofboneandjoint tuberculosis admitted to the LCCschools forthephysicallydefective: from 254
cases in 1921, to 161 cases in 1930: GLRO:RH/HOSP/1/66.
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in the following year, the TUC and Labour Party, in a pamphlet on The Labour
movementandthehospitalcrisis: aschemeforahospitalservice, putforwardasweeping
programme ofreform. The latter's social and political impact is open to question;45
what is evident, however, is that the concepts of "continuity of treatment", "team
work", and the "unification ofcontrol" over all hospital facilities and services were
basic to the scheme. This similarity with the rhetoric ofthe orthopaedic reformers was
not, ofcourse,coincidental; itreflects,rather, thesharedfaithinrationalizationamong
the reform-minded, or in the application of "system and uniformity" to apparent
problems of ever-greater complexity and waste. As is well known, this faith in
rationalization (an ideology informing the problems it sought to solve) was drawn
more or less directly from the world ofAmerican commerce and industry where the
"scientific" principles ofbureaucratic management had proven themselves "rational"
from the point of view ofeconomic efficiency.46
But the campaign for the standardization and co-ordination ofhospital services in
Britain wasmore than merely theextension oftheprinciples ofrationalization as they
were beginning to be applied to post-war industry, transport, and agriculture (as well
as to trade unions). For the TUC and Labour Party, the call for the rationalization of
hospital services was a part ofa bid for an egalitarian distribution ofmedical power
andprovision in a statemedical service. As such, theirplans weredifferentin principle
from those contained in the Dawson Report of 1920. There were also fundamental
differences of focus and concern. In the Dawson Report, the argument for
rationalization was focused on general practice, rather than on hospitals, and there
waslittlereference toaccidentandemergency services. IntheTUCand LabourParty's
vision ofa unified and classless medical system, hospitals were moreimportant,47 and
theaccident servicewasheldtobethefrontlineofmedicalcare-theessential basetoa
pyramid ofservices ascending to university-linked national hospitals.48 To promote a
uniform,co-ordinated accidentsystemwastocriticizetheexistingunequal, haphazard
and confused hospital system. Here, as nowhere else in medicine, it could be made
apparent that in order to meet the needs of patient populations it was vital and
urgent-as vital and urgent as in World War I-to have a regionally co-ordinated,
fullyrationalizedhospital system. Ideally, too,thiswouldbeahospital systeminwhich
therewould be(again asin the recentwar) asalaried medical service, since therecould
be no scope for private practice in the treatment of acute injury.
To no group in medicine was this line of argument more pertinent than to the
orthopaedic advocates offracture services. But there was little hope ofimplementing
45 See A. Marwick, 'The Labour Party and the Welfare State in Britain, 1900-1948', Amer. hist. Rev.,
1967-8, 73: 380-403, esp. at pp. 386-390.
46 SeeLyndallUrwick,Themeaningofrationalisation,London,Nisbit, 1929;inspecificrelationtohospitals,
see Rosner, op. cit., note 22 above.
47 Pointedly, it was declared in a TUC and Labour Party publication ofc. 1922: "Public hospitals when
established should becomethehealth centre orinstitution ofeach local health authority, andshouldprovide
accommodation within their walls for all medical activities." The Labour Movement andpreventive and
curativemedicalservices: astatement ofpolicy with regardtohealth, London, TUCand Labour Party, [n.d.],
p. 6. On the Dawson Report, see the minutes ofthe Consultative Council, PRO: MH/73/38-49, and Frank
Honigsbaum, The division in British medicine, London, Kogan Page, 1979, ch.6.
48 The Labour Movement andthehospitalcrisis, TUC and LabourParty, 1922, p. 7. Seealso 'The Labour
Party and the hospital problem, conference at Caxton Hall', Br. med. J. suppl. 3 May 1924: 213-222.
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such schemes in the financial climate of the early 1920s. Although the TUC and
Labour Party proposals shifted the focus ofreform on to hospital services rather than
general practice, for accident services to be an effective instrument ofrationalization
more would be required than the force ofargument. Certainly, to understand how the
rhetoric ofthe orthopaedic reformers came to have impact in the 1930s, it is important
to appreciate not just the wider political context of reform, but also the more
immediate external pressures that were increasingly coming to bear on the reform of
accident services. In particular, reference can be made to the 1924 Report on the
disposal ofambulance cases; to the growth of concern over the incidence of motor
vehicle accidents; and to the influential model for the handling ofaccident cases, the
Vienna Accident Hospital.
PRESSURE FROM WITHOUT
The first of these sources of pressure in the inter-war period, the Report on the
disposal of ambulance cases, was prepared by a committee of the King Edward's
Hospital Fund for London-a body specifically established for the rationalization of
the voluntary hospitals. Primarily concerned with the costs, distribution, and
availability ofhospital beds for accident cases and with the proper "relationship to be
observed between ... rate-supported institutions and the Voluntary Hospitals", the
report also made apparent that, for all intents and purposes, the metropolis was
without an accident service.49 The LCC's Ambulance Service, which had been
organized in 1915 and was attending some 24,626 calls with its seven ambulances by
1923, wasconstantly faced with theproblem ofwhere to takepatients. Themajorityof
Poor Law infirmaries had no accommodation for accident cases, while most of the
largevoluntaryhospitalsweregrosslyunderprovided. (AttheCharingCrossHospital,
for instance, where 980 accident cases were received in 1923, there were only four
accident beds.)50 When contrasted with the co-ordinated accident service of some
Americancities, andwith theelaborate system fordealingwith fracturecases that had
been in existence at the Massachusetts General Hospital since 1922 (which became
widely known in 1925 through a joint British and American publication),5' the
49 King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, Ambulance Case Disposal Committee: Report ofa Special
Committee, 1924. For discussion ofthis and other literature relating to accident and emergency services in
theinter-warperiod, see K. S. Cliff, 'Thedevelopmentandorganisationofaccidentandemergencyservices',
DM thesis, Southampton University, 1981, pp. 38-76. See also, G. Ayers, 'Ambulance services' in her
England's first state hospitals, London, Wellcome Institute, 1971, pp. 188-192; and D. T. Tugwood,
'Coventry Ambulance Service: its origins and development, 1872-1974', MA thesis, Warwick University,
1984.
50 DirectlyasaresultoftheKing'sFundreport,andinordertosecurefurthermoniesfromtheFund,King's
College Hospital, London, immediately added fourteen accident beds: Br. med. J., 1924, i1:483. Thepublic
image (and hence public funding) ofvoluntary hospitals was seen asjeopardized through revelations about
poor accident facilities; Frank Briant, MP, pointed out to the King's Fund Committee (p. 35): "Ofcourse,
quitewrongly, the average person in the street imagines the Hospital exists for accidents. To a large extent I
do not think it does; but I think it would have a very bad effect upon the finances ofHospitals ifthe general
public had a general idea that accidents had not to be taken there, or they would not deal with them."
51 P. D. Wilson (Harvard) andW. A. Cochrane (Edinburgh), Fracturesanddislocations, Philadelphiaand
London, J. B. Lippincott, 1925, which was reviewed in the Br. med. J., 1925, i: 928-992. Forbackground to
the fracture service in Boston, see 'Discussion on fracture symposium', J. Orthop. Surg., 1921, 3: 556-559
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situation in London appeared antediluvian. Although the committee of the King's
Fund stuck to their brief, it was evident from their report that not only was there an
urgent need for "uniformity of procedure", but also for the centralization and
co-ordination of accident services in London, if not for the control of these services
under a single specialist group.
The second source ofpressure for reform, the rise in the number ofmotor vehicle
accidents, became prominent around the same time as the Reportand, indeed, was not
separate from thelatter'sconcerns.52 Itisironic, ofcourse, thatmotorization, whichin
the form ofambulance transport was vital to the post-war plans for accident services,
was also a major cause ofthe injuries that were to require speedier transport. "Before
the era ofthe motor car", commented the Lancet in 1926, "the receiving officer ofa
large general hospital might be embarrassed by a run of Pott's fractures on the first
snowy evening ofthe year; today a fine Sunday evening may overwhelm any cottage
hospital with a glut of complicated injuries."53 For England and Wales, non-fatal
street accidents involving motor vehicles increased four-fold between 1913 and 1932:
from 38,000 to 162,000, with the most striking rise (unsurpassed until the 1950s)
occurring between 1927 and 1934.54 And, as the Ministry of Transport was acutely
awarein 1928, "Therearefewquestions, asreference tothedailypresswillshow,which
excite more constant and widespread interest."55 Although the number of domestic
and industrial accidents was greater, the socio-medical profile ofroad accidents was
considerably higher, in part because these accidents were not confined to specific
geographical areas and therefore presented severe obstacles to medical planning.56
Allied to this troublesome spatial aspect ofmotorvehicle accidentswas the financial
spectre they raised. Indeed, tomost medical commentators, what mattered more than
the facilities for dealing with these accidents was the problem ofhow to recoup from
insurancecompanies thecosts oftreatingthevictims. The BMA reckoned thatdoctors
were paid in only one out offive cases; and in 1931, it was estimated that some 25,000
victims ofmotoraccidents treated as in-patients involuntary hospitals hadcost nearly
(Jones was present at this meeting). See also, Experience in the management offractures anddislocations, by
the staffofthe fracture service, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, under the general editorship of
P. D. Wilson, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1938.
52 See the King's Fund Report p. 12, for street accidents in London.
53 'Accidentsandhospitals', Lancet, 1926, ii: 864. Seealso Lancet, 1927,i:463; 'Medicalpractitionersand
road accidents', Br. med. J. suppl., 25 July 1931, 62-65; and 'Emergency treatment forroad accidents', ibid.,
1934, ii: 213-214. For the implication ofmotor accidents for cottage hospitals, see Lancet, 1931, i: 1410.
5 BoardofTrade:StatisticalAbstracts, London,HMSO, 1934,p.293,andW.Plowden, Themotorcarand
politics in Britain 1896-1970, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1973, p. 271, and Appendix D,
'Road casualties, 1928-69', p. 483.
55 Quoted in ibid., p. 252.
56 Of 19, 286 fractures cases in 1937, 14.9 per cent were the result of road traffic accidents: Delevigne,
Interim Report ofthe Inter-Departmental Committee on the Rehabilitation ofPersons Injuredby Accidents,
London, HMSO, 1937, p. 8. A LCCinquiry into 1,068 fracture casestreated at fouroftheirhospitalsduring
summerandwintersample periodsin 1936and 1937 revealed thatindustry wasresponsible for 13.5 per cent
(145), road traffic for 22.9 per cent (245), while 63.4 per cent (678) were the result of other causes.
GLRO:PH/HOSP/1/72. In Manchester, where there were annually about 5,000 fracture cases in the early
1930s, 70 per cent were domestic, 18 per cent street accidents, and 12 per cent industrial: see Pickstone,
op. cit., note 20 above, p. 287. For similar American statistics, see Roy N. Anderson, The disabled man and
his vocational adjustment, New York, Institute for the Crippled and Disabled, 1932, p. 12.
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one-quarter of a million pounds.57 This problem, which was to be taken up by
Moynihan in the House ofLords in 1933, was partly solved by the Road Traffic Act
of 1934,58 but the general issue of recovering costs for accident victims who were
covered by insurance for other than hospital medical services remained contentious
(particularly so in the 1930s in relation to patients hospitalized for accidents who
were in receipt of workmen's compensation benefits). Lobby groups such as the
British (Voluntary) Hospitals Association were adamant that the insurance
companies should be made to pay.59 There was little consideration, however, ofthe
possibleill-effects ofallowingprivate insurancecompanies to enterintomedicalcare
as independent third-parties. On the contrary; especially for those with a special
interest in the treatment of injuries who felt themselves peripheral to the core of
hospital medicine-above all, of course, the orthopaedic advocates of fracture
services-there wereevident professional benefits to behadthrough theexploitation
ofthispotential sourceofindependentfunding. ThiswasdemonstratedbyAmerican
hospital experience in the 191Os and early 1920s;60 but the example that was to
outshine all others was the Vienna Accident Hospital, established (in 1925) and
entirely maintained by the Austrian National Insurance Company. A more positive
influence than either the report of the King's Fund or the concern with motor
accidents, the Vienna Accident Hospital also had a more decided effect on the
orthopaedic advocates of fracture clinics.
BOHLER'S ACCIDENT HOSPITAL
The Vienna Accident Hospital was a fully equipped 125-bed institution that had
been organized by Lorenz Bohler, a general surgeon who had developed a special
interest in the treatment offractures during thewar. LikePlatt, Bohler had become a
propagandist of segregated fracture treatment, and he too appreciated the need to
attend to the arguments of the opponents of this specialization. Thus, through an
impressive accumulation ofstatistics, unique for the time, Bohler was to prove not
only that fracture cases were better and more economically treated in his hospital
than elsewhere, but also, that, despite the large number of cases he treated, his
specialist work posed no threat to the supply offracture cases to general surgeons in
57 Plowden, op. cit., note 54above, p. 276. Forstatistics on the victims treated and the costs recovered in
Manchester and Salford in 1932, see Pickstone, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 273.
58 The Road Traffic Act provided for payment up to a maximum of£5 for out-patient cases and£50 for
in-patient care. A feeof 12s. 6d. perpatient was payable by the userofthecar to the doctor or hospital who
first attended the case. Delevigne, op. cit., note 56 above, Finalreport, London, HMSO, 1939, pp. 102-103.
See also, 'Emergency treatment for road accidents', Br. med. J., 1934, ii: 213-214.
59 See,'MemorandumofEvidencebytheBritishHospitalsAssociation',inMinutesofEvidencetakenbefore
theRoyalCommission on Workmen's Compensation, London, HMSO, 1939,1940, p. 1078ff. Seealso, (Cave)
Voluntary Hospitals Committee, Final Report, 1921, Cmd 1335, p. 28, and Hey Groves, 'Treatment of
fractures', Br. med. J., 1928, ii:995.Thevoluntaryhospitalswereinthemostvulnerable positionsince,unlike
the municipal hospitals, they were not empowered to recover costs.
60 SeeCaveReport,op.cit.,note59above,p.28;andVogel,op.cit.,note 19above,pp. 121ff.Theinsurance
companies began to act as a third party in medicine in 1911 after Massachusetts introduced Workmen's
Compensation. See also Rosner, op. cit., note 22 above, p. 94.
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Vienna's major teaching hospitals.61 From this statement alone it is possible to grasp
some of the reasons why, long before 1931 when Bohler was invited to address the
annualmeetingofthe BOA, hishospital hadbecome internationally famous.62 Aswas
made clear in the editorial on 'Accidents and hospitals' in the Lancet in 1926, the
implications of Bohler's work for British medicine were as profound socially,
economically and medico-politically as they were therapeutically.63 Not only had
Bohler demonstrated the clinical advantages of specialized fracture treatment in
restoring patients to their full earning capacity, and hence proved the social value of
this work, but also, while proving to the insurance companies that surgical
specialization could render enormous savings, he had further demonstrated to
enterprising hospital administrators that such specialization could be a paying
proposition. That the Vienna Accident Hospital had "saved the insurance societies
something in theneighbourhood of£18,000" wasjust the sort of"astonishing" fact to
stimulate interest in the whole question ofaccident services and, at the same time, to
draw attention to the "grave scandal" that in Britain the insurance companies
"contribute nothing towards the treatment oftheir injured clients in hospital". "Both
equity and self-interest alike", the Lancet maintained in its editorial, "should lead the
companies to support an accident department in every hospital".
Not surprisingly, it was precisely this conclusion that was also insisted upon by the
orthopaedic advocates ofsegregated fracture services, who naturally found in B6hler's
work a great source ofjustification for their professional cause. Ernest Hey Groves,
who was more insistent than most about the need to convince British insurance
companies "that organisation of fracture treatment would effect so much saving in
compensation as more than to cover the costs of treatment",64 translated Bohler's
workonfractures intoEnglish. Inhispreface, henoted thatBohlerhad "demonstrated
thatthepropertreatmentoffracturesisnotonlyascientificproblemoraphilanthropic
duty, butalso abusinessproposition. In otherwords, itpays to treat fractureswell!"65
Becausethelegitimation oforthopaedicspecialization wasimplicitinanydiscussion
of Bohler's work, orthopaedists, once having made the economic point, served their
interests further merely by extolling B6hler's therapeutics. But, like an earlier
generation ofvisitors to the clinic ofThomas and Jones in Liverpool, the orthopaedic
visitors to Bohler's clinic were less impressed by his various surgical and manipulative
techniques (though many of these were praised as "revolutionary" and their results
61 B6hler, The treatment offractures, trans. by M. E. Steinberg, Vienna, Wilhelm Maudrick, 1929,
preface; Platt, 'Orthopaedics in Europe', op. cit., note 5above, pp. 84-85. Bohler, The treatmentoffractures,
4th English ed. trans. from the 4th enl. and rev. German ed. of 1933, Bristol, J. Wright, 1935, p. 538.
62 See, forexample, C. V. Mackay, 'Dr. Bohler's FractureClinicinVienna', Br. med. J., 1935, i: 522. Platt
and Bristow visited B6hler's clinic in 1929 on behalfofthe BOA, see, 'The log ofVienna, 26-29 September
1929', MS typescript, BOA archives, Royal College of Surgeons. For Bohler's visit to England, see,
J. Bone Jt Surg., 1931, 13: 382-383. A visit to Bohler's clinic was regarded as a badge of progressivism
among orthopaedists in the 1930s and was often symbolized (as in Platt's case) by the adoption of the
useofplaster-of-Paris. T. Porter McMurray, oneofJones's successors in Liverpool, continued to usesplints
rather than plaster in the 1930s, "never having visited Bohler's clinic"; Platt, interview with the author,
7 November 1984.
63 Lancet, 1926, ii: 864. See also ibid., i: 383, where Bohler's clinic is described as having become "a
mid-European fracture synod".
64'The organization of the treatment of fractures', Br. med. J., 1935, i: 817.
65 Bohler (1935), op. cit., note 61 above, p.i.
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described as "startling"), than by his meticulous organization.66 Bohler himself
regarded his organization for the overall control offracture treatment as the secret of
his success, and specifically likened it to the progress ofrationalization that in recent
yearshad renderedindustry, transport, andagriculturemoreefficient. Itwasbymeans
ofthesubdivision ofthelabourprocess, heinsisted, thatthepartsofmedical treatment
were simplified and greater efficiency resulted.67
Butfortwoveryobvious reasons, theproponentsofsegregatedfractureserviceshad
tobehighlyselectiveintheiruseofBohler'smodel. First, hishospital wasintendednot
just forfractures, but foraccident cases ofall kinds. References to the hospital did not
thereforeautomatically servetheinterestsofthoseseekingtoexpandtheirprofessional
space on the basis of fracture treatment alone. Although in selected industries and
industrial regions in Britain, fractures predominated over other injuries, in general
only about ten percent ofall cases ofinjury involved fractures.68 Thus arguments for
the segregation of accident cases did not necessarily compel a commanding role for
orthopaedists, nor even necessitate their employment in accident services.
The other reason why orthopaedists had to be selective in their use of the Bohler
modelwasthatBohler'shospitalwasaseparateinstitution. Assuchithardlyfurthered
the orthopaedists' main ambition of securing for themselves and their specialism a
permanent niche within teaching hospitals. The last thing that British orthopaedists
wanted was to end up like Bohler, "cut offentirely from general hospitals and cut off
entirely from the general surgical and medical staffs [and students]".69 That at the
meeting at Bath it had been George Gask who had warmly endorsed the idea of an
accidenthospital forLondonwouldhavebeenwarningenoughtomostorthopaedists to
keepfirmlybefore them the object ofsecuringfracture clinicswithin generalhospitals.70
Yet it was not by rejecting outright the idea of accident hospitals that those
interested in segregated fracture treatment in Britain established the priority oftheir
66 Ibid., p.i. For comments on the therapies and the impressive results, see Bick, op. cit., note 1 above,
pp. 293-294; W. H. Ogilvie, 'Physiology and the surgeon', Edinb. med. J., 1936, 43: repr. in his Surgery:
orthodox, andheterodox, Oxford, Blackwell Medical Publications, 1948, pp. 147-167 at p. 152; and Platt,
'The evolution ofthe treatment offractures', Manchester Univ. Med. SchoolGaz., 1938, 17: 56-62 at p. 59.
67 Bohler (1935), op. cit., note 61 above, p. 14ff.
68 Delevigne, Finalreport, op. cit., note 58 above, p. 14ff. See also, for 1935, statistics on the incidence of
fractures at 33 LCC hospitals, in GLRO:PH/HOSP/l/72.
69 T. P. McMurray inthediscussion onthepaper byH. E. Moore, 'Avoidable wastageinconnexionwith
industrial injuries', Lpoolmed.-chir. J, 1933, 41: 19-50 at p. 38. McMurray, however, was in favour ofcentral
hospitals for traumatic surgery and rehabilitation, such as Robert Jones had proposed in 1923 to the West
Derby Board ofGuardians for theconversion ofthe Alder Hey Poor Law Infirmary. One ofthe few persons
onthe BMA FractureCommittee toendorse theaccidenthospital concept wasW. McAdam Eccles,colleague
of Gask and surgeon to the Orthopaedic Department at St Bartholomew's Hospital (1903-12) before
becoming a consulting surgeon specializing in fractures. He advocated establishing a Bohler-like industrial
accident clinic at the British Postgraduate Medical School at Hammersmith. See discussion in Donald
C. Norris (Principal MOH to the Bank of England), Presidential Address to the Hunterian Society, 'Some
medical problems in accident insurance', Trans. Hunter Soc., 1937-8, 2: 10-36, at p. 32. An earlier dissenting
voice against fracture clinics, as opposed to trauma centres, was that of Professor A. W. Sheen ofCardiff,
in the discussion at Bath in 1925, op. cit., note 36 above, p. 327. The problem ofspecialist services isolated
from one another by function, administration, and personnel was apparent to those compiling the Hospital
Surveys in the 1940s, as Sir George Godber has recently recalled: lecture, Manchester, 4 December 1984.
70 As recalled, significantly, in an editorial on 'The treatment offractures', Br. med. J., 1927, ii: 695. In
America in the 1930s, orthopaedic surgeons were increasingly fearful that their specialism would be diluted
anditsborders blurred iftoomuchworkwasdevoted tothe"attractive and lucrative treatment oftraumatic
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claims. Rather, it was by putting accident hospitals forward as one option among
others that, at one and the same moment, they exploited the wider social and political
issue ofaccidentservices, and servedtheirowninterest inhospital fracture services. To
do this, the orthopaedic reformers simply reinforced the point made by the Lancet in
1926, that the administrative difficulties and costs involved in establishing separate
accident hospitals made it more sensible to try to develop accident departments in
existing general hospitals.7' While explaining the difficulties involved in establishing
separate accident hospitals, they revealed the economic viability ofhospital fracture
clinics. This was how Hey Groves presented thecase for fracture clinics to the LCC in
the mid-1930s.72 Around the same time, in an address on 'Broken bones and money
wasted' totheNational SafetyCouncil, heproceeded furtheralongtheroadtomaking
an economic virtue ofnecessity: "To avoid all the muddle and inefficiency it was not
necessary first to provide a large special hospital devoted to accidents [The Times
reported]. The principles oforganisation were comparatively simple and cheap; they
required no new buildings nor any capital expenditure."73 Hence, when the medical
officer at St James' Hospital, Balham, William Gissane, tried to win the LCC over to
the idea of separate "Units [of 100 to 150 beds] for Traumatic Surgery" instead of
"fracture clinics", and offered to take a £200 cut in his salary in order to be able to
direct such a unit, he was dismissed as an idealist and branded a bad character
interested only in furthering his own career.74 "My present enthusiasm", he had
explained, "isnotamushroomgrowthfollowing ahardworking fourweek visitto Dr.
Lorenz Bohler in Vienna, but that holiday showed me the Hospital ofmy ideals as a
reality."75 In 1941, Gissane's dream came true with his appointment to the new
Birmingham Accident Hospital-the only accident hospital ever created in Britain,
and occupational injuries". F. D. Dickson in his Presidential Address to the American Orthopaedic
Association in 1936, who also feared "that we will lose our sense ofproportion and cease to beorthopaedic
surgeonsand becometraumatic surgeons.... Soonerorlater, ourmembership will have to make adecision
as to what extent orthopaedic surgery and traumatic surgery can be mixed." J. Bone Jt Surg., 1936, 18:
263-269. ForBritishorthopaediststhiswasasecondaryconsiderationinthe 1930s, butitloomedlargerafter
the Second World War. See, for example, 'Discussion by Fellows of the [B.O.] Association on the
relationship oforthopaedic surgery to traumatic surgery', J. Bone Jt Surg., 1949, 31B: 633-635.
7 Lancet, 1926, ui: 864.
72 SeeGLRO:PH/HOSP/1/72.GroveshadreportedtotheLCConthefractureproblemafterstudyingseven
LCC hospitals in 1936 for material for his lectures on fracture organization to the British Postgraduate
MedicalSchool. CharlesHill,AssistantMedicalSecretaryoftheBMA, wrotetoWilliamAllenDaley(Chief
MedicalOfficerforthe LCC) on 18April 1934(while the BMA Fracture Committee wassitting): "You deal
with thelargerproblem oforthopaediccases ingeneral and had [sic] inmindparticularly theadministrative
problemsencountered as aresult ofthevariety ofagencies atwork. The Fracture Committeedealingwith a
smaller, a clear-cut problem, is approaching its problem in a missionary spirit with perhaps a lesser
consideration for administrative problems."
73 'Cooperation in first aid', The Times, I June 1935, p. 11. Cf. the views on separate accident hospitals
offered by Sir Arnold Wilson and by Sir Walter Citrine and Dr H. B. Morgan (for the TUC) in the Royal
Commission on Workmen's Compensation, op. cit., note 59 above, pp. 353, 481.
74 SeeGissane'sletterof30October 1938andtheattached notebyDrBruce(PrincipalMOtotheLCC): "I
donotsaythatGissaneiswrongbut Ifeel thatheistrying torush usforpersonal reasons; ... heisprobably
a good surgeon, but there is also some evidence that he is ... an uncertain teacher ... [his] proposal could
gethim outofhispresentpositioninto ananomalous one andgivehim, possibly, a[?] claim to one ofthebig
jobs." GLRO:PH/HOSP/4/33.
75 Letter to Dr Brander of the LCC, 31 July 1936, in GLRO:PH/HOSP/4/27.
324The meaning offractures
and itself something of an accident.76 But this was after the establishment of the
Emergency Medical Serviceduringthe SecondWorldWar-after, thatis, government
backing had already been secured for hospital fracture services under orthopaedic
control. Not until then did members of the BOA begin collectively to push for the
nationalprovision ofwhatthey at firstcalled"Orthopaedic and AccidentServices".77
And only then was it to be said (as by Platt in 1950) that "the Vienna
experiment ... has proved that within the framework of comprehensive orthopaedic
schemes there is a place for the accident hospital."78 (my italics).
STATE, INDUSTRY, AND ORGANIZED LABOUR
Throughout the 1930s, orthopaedists continued to argue that the private insurance
companies ought to be induced or be compelled by "legal enactment" to support
fracture services. But hopes for tangible results from this quarter steadily diminished.
Aspointed outatameetingin the Ministry ofHealthin 1930, theinsurancecompanies
were simply not interested in arguments for the more efficient treatment offractures:
"[they] simply say that so far as they are concerned, it is a question offinance, and the
premiums are so regulated that they cover even the most expensive case. Any attempt
on the part ofthe doctors or the hospitals to reduce the period ofincapacity would
merely mean that employers would press for a lower premium and the Insurance
Company would be no better off than before. We cannot hope, therefore, for much
helpinthewayofsecuringimprovedtreatmentfromtheInsuranceCompanies."79The
official line of the insurance companies, as the Federated Employers Insurance
Association told Hey Groves in 1936, was that by the terms of the legislation on
workmen's compensation, they were unable "to do anything more than pay the
compensation so fixed",80 but the real problem seems to have been the competition
between theinsurers themselves. A representative ofoneofthe companiespointed out
76 The opening of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham left the centrally located Birmingham
General Hospital vacantandavailableforconversion undertheEmergencyMedical Service. SeeMinistryof
Health, Hospital survey: West Midlands, London, HMSO, 1945, p. 15; P. Clarkson, 'Out-patient
arrangements and accident services', Guy'sHosp. Gaz., 1948, 62: 202-211 at pp. 208-209; and Alan Ruscoe
Clarke, etal., 'Organisation ofaccident services', in Clarke etal. (editors), Modern trends in accidentsurgery
and medicine, London, Butterworth, 1959, pp. 1-8.
77 See BOA, Memorandum on Fracture andAccident Services Committee, London, 1943; see also, G. R.
Girdlestone, 'A regional orthopaedic and accident service', Br. med. J., 1949, i: 720-722; and J. Trueta,
Gathorne Robert Girdlestone, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 79. For a survey of the subsequent
developmentoforthopaedic andaccidentservices, seeNuffield Provincial HospitalsTrust, Casualtyservices
andtheirsetting: astudy inmedicalcare, Oxford, 1960; BOA, Casualtydepartments: the Accident Committee
(July 1973), which led toW. Lewin, Medicalstaffingofaccidentandemergencyservices: a reportpreparedon
behalfoftheJoint ConsultantsCommitteeandpresentedinApril1978, BMA, 1978.Thelatterobservedthatof
228 major A/E departments, 174 were under the control of orthopaedic surgeons.
78 Platt, 'Orthopaedics in Europe', op. cit., note 5 above, p. 85.
79 Meetingof22December 1930,atDrT.Carnwath'sofficeattheMinistryofHealth(acopyoftheminutes
ofwhich werecirculated inCountyHall): GLRO:PH/HOSP/1/66. Themeetingwasapparentlyforgottenby
1936, when SirFrederic Menzies, head ofthemedical servicesforthe LCC, held ameeting on fractureclinics
with Sir Malcolm Delevigne and, referring to the practice ofthe Metropolitan Life Assurance Company of
New York, "suggested that some of the bigger London insurance companies might be approached. He
thought that grants from industry or insurance companies would greatly facilitate the establishment of
special fracture units by the LCC." (GLRO:PH/HOSP/l/73.)
80 The Times, quoted in 'Memorandum of evidence from the British Hospital Association', Royal
Commission on Workmen's Compensation, op. cit., note 59 above, p. 1078. See also, 'Memorandum of
evidence from Accident Officers' Association', ibid., p. 828ff.
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in 1935: "while certain insurance corporations might very well be inclined to put up
considerable sums for rehabilitation work they were held back by the consideration
that their action would be benefiting other companies which were not contributing at
all.,,81
Increasingly, therefore, orthopaedists came to realize that only through state
initiatives and through public funding would fracture and rehabilitation services be
effectively implemented. Through their work with crippled children (which involved
remuneration from the Board of Education, Ministry of Health, and Local
Authorities), they were already accustomed and well disposed to the benefits ofstate
support. The virtues of state involvement and assistance were made strikingly
apparent, moreover, in the contrast between, on the one hand, the relatively positive
response to accident and fracture services on the part of the county council and
municipal hospital authorities and, on the other hand, the generally reluctant attitude
towards them and their co-ordination on the part of the voluntary hospitals. In
London, some ofthe larger voluntary hospitals (partly for reasons ofautonomy, but
mostly because of financial constraints) had actually gone so far as to make
arrangementsforsendingtheirfracturecasestothose LCChospitals wheresegregated
fracture services had beenestablished.82 "One almost fears that nothingshort ofsome
social cataclysm, such as Communism, bankruptcy, or war, will be strong enough to
break old prejudices", complained Hey Groves in 1933, after a frustrating and futile
attempt to secure the co-operation of the voluntary hospitals in Bristol.83
Honigsbaum has claimed that it was the recognition ofthese obstacles to fracture
clinicsand,hence, totheplace(and/orgreaterstanding) oforthopaedistswithin British
teaching hospitals, that led the orthopaedists to be "the 'radicals' of the medical
profession" pressingfortheentirereorganization ofthe healthservices.84 Such aclaim
is valid, at least in the absence offurther detailed studies ofthe politics ofthe medical
profession in this period, andespecially ifone is referring-as Honigsbaum is-to the
outspoken Liverpool orthopaedist, fracture expert, and leading BOA political activist
from the mid-1930s, Reginald Watson-Jones.85 But whether or not it is the case that
81 'Rehabilitation ofthe disabled', Br. med. J., 1935, i: 726. In fact, however, two orthopaedic hospitals
were heavily subsidized by groups of insurers: the Harlow Wood Orthopaedic Hospital, near Mansfield,
Notts., and the Manfield Orthopaedic Hospital, Northampton, both in mining districts. See Royal
Commission on Workmen's Compensation, op. cit., note 59 above, p. 1084.
82 See J. C. Nicholson, 'Fracture ofthe neck ofthe femur, a personal experience', Br. med. J., 1938, ii:
464 466; and Hey Groves' comments on this article, ibid., 1938, ii: 633-634. The exceptions among the
voluntary hospitals were theroyal infirmaries in Manchesterand Liverpool, the former under Platt (who in
1932 was the first orthopaedic surgeon to be appointed to the MRI), the latter under Reginald
Watson-Jones.
83 HeyGroves, 'Asurgical adventure: anautobiographical sketch', repr. from Bristolmed.-chir. J., 1933,
50: 22.
84 Honigsbaum, op. cit., note 47 above, p. 240.
85 Watson-Jones was the author ofthe famous textbook Fractures andother bone andjoint injuries, first
published in 1940, and was subsequently the editor of the British volumes of the J. Bone Jt Surg. and
presidentoftheBOA(seeobituary in Br. med. J., 1972,ii: 533). Hisearlycareerowedmuch to RobertJones,
and he studied fracture treatment under Platt at Ancoats before establishing his fracture clinic at the Royal
Liverpool Infirmary. In 1943, he wasappointed director oftheorthopaedic and accidentdepartment ofthe
London Hospital. Involved with the Miners' Welfare Commission and TUC over the rehabilitation of
workers in the 1930s (see below), he went to Russia in 1943 at the same time as the TUCdelegation (see his
'Russian surgeonsand Russian surgery', Br. med. J., 1943, ii: 276; and WalterCitrine, Two careers: asecond
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orthopaedists before 1948 were "almost alone among consultants [in welcoming]
... proposals forthe statecontrol ofthevoluntary sector",86 thisshouldcertainly not
betakenastheirpositioninthe 1930s. AsrevealedinHeyGroves' HarveianOrationof
1930 (delivered while he was president of the Association of Surgeons of Great
Britain),whatwasbeingcalledforthen, quiteexplicitly, was"Stateaid,whichdoesnot
involve State control".87 State aid, unlike state control, was seen as the means to
forcingthevoluntaryhospitalsintobecomingpubliclyaccountableand(viathecapital
that hopefully would become available for the development of modern scientific
techniques and procedures) to theircoming further under the control and direction of
"medicalexperts". The 1929 Local Government Act, Hey Groves believed, had "gone
a long way toward making possible a general unification ofthe hospital system", but
because theActhadleftthefinancial structure ofthevoluntaryhospitalsintact, thelay
managers ofthese hospitals could still use "any excuse orjustification forbehaving as
though they controlled a proprietary institution".88 At root, therefore, state aid was
themeans to undermine the authority that was seen as blocking notjust the particular
interests of the orthopaedists but, more generally, the reformist principles they held
dear and generally applicable: uniformity of procedure, co-ordination of specialist
effort, and control by medical experts. Socialized medicine was clearly not the object;
to seek state support for voluntary hospitals in order to facilitate their control by
consultant specialists was to occupy a middle ground between voluntarism and
statism-a ground potentially as free from bossy state bureaucrats and Medical
Officers of Health as from proprietorial hospital governors.
The occupation ofthismiddle groundwasnotunique to orthopaedists and, in fact, in
his Harveian Oration, Hey Groves hardly referred to their interests specifically. Yet it
was their interests above all that were served by the argument for state aid. However
essential public funding was for the modernization ofvoluntary hospitals, it was even
more essential for future specialists in fracture work, since (unlike most of the senior
orthopaedic surgeons advocating fracture services in the 1930s), they could expect to
have little time for remunerative private consulting. Clearly, to establish firmly and
maintainthesought-after nicheinthehigh-statusvoluntaryhospitals,itwasnecessaryat
the same time to secure salaries on at least a part-time basis. (In view ofthe diminishing
state-remunerated work with crippled children, this financial need was all the more
pressing.) The BMA, prior to the TUC in 1922, had recommended salaries for the
volume of autobiography, London, Hutchinson, 1967, pp. 167-168, 171). However, when it came to
implementing the NHS, bywhich time hisprivatepractice in Londonwaslargeandworld famous, heargued
for restraint and turned against a full salaried service: "We want freedom from medical control, and that
freedom demands privatepractice. I sawtheabolition ofsuch freedom in Russia, andithasmeanttheendof
medical progress in that country": 'The consultant's vote', Br. med. J., 1948, i: 264-267 at p. 266.
86 Honigsbaum, op. cit., note 47 above, p. 240.
87 'Should medicine be a mendicant? A review ofour hospital service', Lancet, 1930, i: 1107. Seealso the
argument for state-funded orthopaedic institutions in Ireland managed by private societies and under the
control oforthopaedists: W. C. Somerville-Large, 'Study of a national orthopaedic system', Irish J. med.
Sci., 1937, 6th ser.: 161-172, and idem., 'The orthopaedic problem in Ireland', ibid., 1935, 6th ser.: 82-88.
88 HeyGroves,op.cit., note 83above, pp. 1106,1051. Amongotherconsultants atthistimetocall forstate
aid without state control was H. S. Souttar, surgeon to the London Hospital, who was subsequently the
Chairman ofthe BMA Fracture Committee. See Arthur Newsholme, Medicine andthe state, London Allen
& Unwin, 1932, pp. 48-49.
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residentstaffsofvoluntaryhospitals, butnoonehadrecommended thatconsultantsbe
"salaried".89 Before the mid-1930s, the idea was virtually unthinkable within the
voluntary sector, and even in the LCC's hospitals it was not until the mid-1930s that
the practice was begun on a small scale (though there were, ofcourse, payments for
consulting surgeons).90 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Hey Groves and other
advocates oforthopaedic specialization in the early 1930s did not specifically refer to
the state remuneration offracture "experts" when they urged the voluntary hospitals
to enter into a relationship with the state that was not unlike that then existing for the
BBC and the universities. To have done so would have weakened their case in certain
quarters and generally have played up the fact (appreciated by a sub-committee ofthe
Voluntary Hospitals Committee for London in a report of 1939 on Organisedfracture
servicesfor London) that "the voluntary hospitals are being called upon to play a
prominent part in what is virtually a new type of service and that payment of
whole-time directors ofregistrars will inevitably involve additional expense".9
Connected to the reason why orthopaedists did not press for salaried service in the
early 1930s (and, paradoxically, a part ofthe reason why thereafter they increasingly
becameadvocatesofstateinvolvementinhospitals)wastheirrisinghopethatfinancial
and moral support for their fracture cause might be forthcoming from the private
sector-in particular from large industry. Suchhopes had indeedexisted from thevery
beginning ofthefracture movement andhadbeen nourished in the 1920s by American
examples ofindustry-based accident and rehabilitation services.92 It was not until the
early 1930s, however, as a result of a notable British example, that the orthopaedic
reformers began in earnest to make their pitch to industrialists.
89 Referred to in The Labour Movement and the hospital crisis, op. cit., note 48 above, p. 11. So too,
SomervilleHastings' proposal thatgeneralpractitionersbecomesalaried servants ofthestatewasrejected by
the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on Public Health in theearly 1930s: see Marwick, op. cit., note45
above, p. 389. By 1939, however, there was, as Menzies stated, "a growing demand for remuneration ofthe
'Honorary' medical staffs": PRO: MH/80/24. In general, the more pay-patients there were in public
hospitals, the greater was the demand by doctors and consultants for payment, and on these grounds, in
1935,boththeBMAandtheLiverpool HospitalCommission approved thepaymentofhospitalconsultants.
See Political and Economic Planning, Report on the British health services, London, 1937, pp. 240-261.
90 The orthopaedic surgeon, W. H. Trethowen, for instance received 200 guineas p.a. in the 1920s as
consultant toQueen Mary's Hospital forChildren, Carshalton: Metropolitan AsylumsBoardMinutes, 1922,
p. 220. Since 1933, the LCC had approved the appointment to its hospitals ofcertain medical and surgical
specialists. However, it was reported in 1939 that "very little further progress in this direction has ... been
possible, owing to theenormous amount ofwork involved in thereorganisation ofthehospitals. Indeed, the
onlycaseinwhichactionhadbeentaken toimplement thepolicywastheappointmentofasurgeonspecialist
at Lambeth hospital." 'Extract of the Report of the Hospital and Medical Service Committee on LCC
Hospital Division. Agenda for 14 March 1939', GLRO:PH/HOSP/4/28. At the meeting on fracture clinics
held at County Hall, 16June 1938, the appointment offull-time officers had been criticized on the grounds
that "there would not beadequatecompetition between them and that this would ultimately be detrimental
to their efficiency." GLRO:PH/HOSP/4/25, and see note 97 below.
91 VoluntaryHospitalsCommitteeforLondon,OrganisedFractureServicesforLondon:ReportbyFracture
Sub-Committee, June 1939, p. 6.
92 Platthadconcludedhis 1921 articleop.cit.,(note20above): "Itis unnecessary toelaboratetheobvious
economic importance to industry in general ofthe efficient treatment offractures. Those who are engaged
activelyinthiswork areawareofthefactthatemployers, insurancecompanies, and trade-unions arealive to
thenecessity for reform." Themain Americanexample ofa company accident service was thatorganized in
1909 by William O'Neill Sherman (a member of the Fracture Committee of the American College of
Surgeons) at the Carnegie Steel Corporation in Pittsburg: see T. L. Hazlett and W. W. Hummel, Industrial
medicine in Western Pennsylvania 1850-1950, University of Pittsburg Press, 1957, pp. 73-75, 244-7.
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The motivatingexample was thework ofH. E. Moore at the LMS Railwayyards at
Crewe. Begun on a small scale in the late 1920s at the suggestion ofGwynne Maitland
(medical officer to the Cunard Steamship Company), Moore's rehabilitation of
fracture cases became widely known in government and medical circles in the early
1930s. Personally threatened bythepossibleclosure ofthecompany hospital atCrewe,
Moore became a strong advocate ofthe expert control and supervision ofindustrial
injuries against what he saw as the incompetence of National Insurance general
practitioners and hospital general surgeons.93 Although British orthopaedists as a
professional body seeking entry into the teaching hospitals were not interested in
industrial medicine as such, they found Moore's work useful in campaigning against
the social and economic evils ofthe so-called "wastage" ofindustrial labour through
medical incompetence. On the basis of Moore's work, it was argued that it was
economically advantageous (for large self-insured companies at least) to have
industrial injuries, and fractures in particular, treated by experts in order to avoid the
unnecessary legal botherandexpenseofworkmen'scompensation claimsand to avoid
as well, purported malingering.94
Verylargely, thiswas how thecasewasputin theappendix to the BMA's influential
'Report on fractures' of 1935.95 Since Moore and Maitland were among those who
made up the committee that produced the report (along with Bristow and Hey
Groves), the bias is hardly surprising. Yet beyond alerting employers to the issue of
fractures, the pitch had little effect. In a context of high unemployment and cheap
labour, few employers were seriously concerned about labour "wastage". Moreover,
fewemployerswerelikeCunard Steamships orthe LMS Railwayincarryingtheirown
insurance risks, and theythereforehad aslittleincentiveas theinsurancecompaniesto
become directly involved with fracture treatment as a means to economy.
Ironically, the BMA's 'Report on fractures' made its deepest impact not among the
managers of industry, but among organized labour (though, as we have seen, there
were long-standing reasons why organized labour, and the TUC in particular, should
have responded favourably).96 Ignoring the overtures oforthopaedists to industrialists,
labour leaders took up the cause not only because ofthe serious effect offractures on
workers' wages and job retention, but also because here was an issue on the financial
93 Moore, op. cit., note 69 above; idem, 'Observations on the after-care ofindustrial casualties', together
withextractsfromhisAnnualReportsoftheCreweHospice, 1927-30,submitted toT.Carnwath, Ministryof
Health,22December 1930, inGLRO:PH/HOSP/1/66; andseetheobituaryon MoorebyWatson-JonesinJ.
Bone Jt Surg., 1952, 34B: 708. On the quiet but important role of Gwynne Maitland in the fracture
movement, see his obituary, also by Watson-Jones, in ibid., 1949, 31B: 130-131.
94 Comparisonsbetweenaverageincapacityperiodsforfracturestreatedin"organized"fractureclinicsand
those "not treated in organized clinics" (but presumably in hospitals) were given in the BMA's 'Report on
fractures', op. cit., note 17 above, pp. 54-55. Fractures ofthe femur, forexample, were claimed to average
thirty-seven weeks in an organized clinic as opposed to sixty weeks elsewhere. But see subsequent reneging
and qualifying in R. Watson-Jones, 'Slow union of fractures', Br. J. Surg., 1943, 30: 260-275.
9 'Appendix: non-medical factorsofprolongeddisability', 'Reportonfractures',op.citnote 17above,pp.
60-62. Ofthe seventeen members ofthe BMA Fracture Committee, ten were members ofthe BOA; ofthe
others, only H. S. Souttar, the Chairman, Henry Brackenbury, and Bishop Harman did not have a vested
interest in thecampaign for fracture clinics. Platt, who was not on theCommittee, was then President ofthe
BOA.
96 See, forexample, General FederationofTrade Unions,ReportofConJerence onInstitutional Treatment
ofFractures, 7 October 1936 at Onward Hall, Manchester, London, Co-op Printing Society, 1936.
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and social importance ofwhich there was wide public agreement,97 it was a means to
restate the accident-service rationale for a unified and "classless" hospital service,
centrally co-ordinated and regionally administered and financed. Thus the TUC and
Labour Party made fracture services a part oftheir political platform on health care
and, jointly with the orthopaedists (officially through the BMA), presented a
memorandum on rehabilitation and industrial injury to the government's Inter-
Departmental Committee in December 1937.98 Drafted and promoted by Watson-
Jones, the memorandum called for the deployment of experts in orthopaedic and
traumatic surgery. It was subsequently presented to the (Hetherington) Royal
CommissiononWorkmen'sCompensationatitssittingsof1939-40,and,ingeneral, its
point ofviewanditsemphasis on rehabilitation weretaken upin the Beveridge Report
and other pieces of war- and post-war legislation.99
This is not the place fully to enter into the social and political nature ofthe rapport
betweentheTUCand LabourPartyandtheorthopaedicreformers, nortodwell on the
interesting resonances and ambiguities in the use of the term "rehabilitation".100
Suffice to say here that the connexion with the TUC and Labour Party tempered the
orthopaedists' pursuit ofindustrialists and encouraged them further along the road to
state involvement in health care.
EFFECTS AND MEANINGS
If measured by the number of the hospital fracture clinics established before the
SecondWorldWar,theorthopaedists' campaign forfractureserviceswould haveto be
reckoned, at best, only a partial success. The government's (Delevigne) Inter-
Departmental Committee onthe Rehabilitation ofPersons Injured byAccidents, after
announcing in their Interim report of 1937 that there were "many indications that a
widespreadmovementfortheestablishmentoffractureclinicshasbegunandislikelyto
makerapidheadway",wasforcedtoconfessinitsFinalreportof1939that"progressin
thegeneralapplicationofthemhasnotbeenasrapidaswehoped. Thematterhadbeen
taken up in a number ofplaces ... [but] the hope that a general movement had been
started andwould becarried through by the hospitals themselves, both voluntary and
97 Bythemid-1930s, opposition tosegregated fracture treatment appears to have beenminimal. Theonly
opposition cited by the (admittedly partial) Delevigne Committee was that of certain general surgeons in
Scotland who felt that the principle ofa segregated service in a separate hospital department would entail
"an inevitable loss ofhealthy rivalry between surgical members ofthe staff". No opposition from general
practitioners is evident; indeed, the Delevigne Committee were confident that the "small number of
fractures ... treated bygeneral practitioners ... may beexpected todecrease in proportion to thespread of
fracture schemes." Delevigne, Final Report, op. cit., note 58 above, pp. 32, 50.
98 For the Joint TUC-BMA memorandum, see Br. med. J. suppl., 18 December 1937: 367-371; or
'Appendix D' to the Memorandum of Evidence by the TUC to the Royal Commission on Workmen's
Compensation, op. cit., note 59 above, pp. 445-448; TUC General Council's Report to the Blackpool
Congress, 1938, paragraphs 88-103; and 'Joint Committee of BMA and TUC (1936-9)', 3 vols., BMA
archives. On theCommittee itself, asviewed largely from theperspective oftheTUC(and without reference
to the fracture issue), see R. Earwicker, 'A study ofthe BMA-TUCJoint Committee on Medical Questions,
1935-1939', J. Soc. Pol., 1979, 8: 335-356.
99 See,inparticular, [G.Tomlinson], ReportoftheInter-Departmental Committee on theRehabilitation and
ResettlementofDisabledPersons, 1943, Cmd. 6415; and seeHonigsbaum, op.cit., note47 abovech. 24: 'The
BMA-TUC alliance and the Beveridge Report'.
100 Onthelatter, see R. E. Matkin, 'Rehabilitation: anambiguous term and unfulfilled ideal', Rehab. Lit.,
1985, 46: 314-320.
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municipal individually orinco-operation, hasnotbeenrealised."''° By 1939onlyfour
out oftwelve London teaching hospitals had fully developed fracture services, while
650 out of some 825 voluntary and municipal hospitals were still relying on
"unorganized" general surgical routine for their fracture cases. Differences between
hospitals, financial constraints, and the shortage of qualified fracture experts were
amongthemanyfactors thatheld backtheimplementation andregionalco-ordination
of "ideal" fracture services.
More significant to the orthopaedic reformers than the findings of the Delevigne
Committee, however, was the fact ofits existence, and the fact that, despite its brief, it
chose to concentrate exclusively on the issue ofthe organization ofefficient fracture
services.102 Likethe BMA's'Reporton fractures', theDelevignereports, byreiterating
the orthopaedists' social, therapeutic, and economic rationales for efficient fracture
treatment, legitimated the professional self-interests behind them. Not only did the
Delevigne Committee justify the control of fractures in the hands of "fracture
experts",'03 but also, by complying with the notion that the voluntary hospitals were
the most appropriate place for fracture clinics, it granted to orthopaedists the status
and authority they had been seeking, and the basis for the reproduction of that
authority through access to undergraduate teaching. Further, by recommending
"departure from ordinary practice in respect of... remuneration" in the form of
honoraria ofbetween £300 and£500 perannum to thesurgeon-in-charge ofa fracture
clinic, the Committee came close to accepting a salaried service for orthopaedists
within the voluntary sector.104
But the Delevigne reports have an importance beyond that for orthopaedists. They
stand, with measures such as the Cancer Act of 1939, as evidence of government
commitment to an organized, statutory health service which included medical
specialists and their work in voluntary hospitals. Previously, where government had
been involved in health-care activities (such as tuberculosis schemes and those for
maternity and child welfare), the concentration was on "public health" conceived
largely in terms ofpreventive-cum-"personal health services". By the 1930s, however,
the focus of development for central government and for many Medical Officers of
Health lay with curative services, including the development of municipal hospitals,
theirstaffingwithconsultants, andtheirrelationswiththevoluntaryhospitals. Inthese
101 Delevigne, Interim Report, op. cit., note 56above, p. 7; and FinalReport, op. cit., note 58 above, p. 26.
St Bartholomew's Hospital had a fracture service from 1927, but the in-patient treatment offractures was
shared by general surgeons, with only special cases being referred to the Orthopaedic Department. At St
Thomas' and theWestminsterhospitals a similarsituation existed in the 1930s. A segregated fractureservice
adhering to the principles ofcontinuity oftreatment, unity ofcontrol under an orthopaedist, and after-care
was established at the Manchester Royal Infirmary (under Platt) in 1936. See BMA 'Report on fractures',
op. cit., note 17 above, p. 56ff.
102 DelevigneFinalReport,op.cit.,note58above,pp.4,23-25,121.TheCommitteetookitasgiventhatthe
principles of fracture organization as laid down in the BMA Report "were accepted by the Government
Departments concerned".
103 Delevigne,carefulalwaystoavoidbothcontroversyanddissentinhisCommittee,waswellawareof"the
difficulty which existed as to whether an orthopaedic surgeon or a general surgeon should undertake the
treatment offractures". At ameetingwith Sir Frederic Menzies, 6 May 1938, he let it be known "that itwas
the intention of his committee to use the term 'fracture surgeon' only". GLRO:PH/HOSP/4/28.
104 Delevigne Interim Report, op. cit., note 56 above, p. 11; and see the editorial in Br. med. J., 1939, ii:
402-403. It was widely recognized that "honoraria" in this context was a euphemism for "salaries": see, for
example, Medical Officer, 26 June 1937, 255.
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discussions, which lasted through the Second World War, "medical rationalizers"
played a key role-some ofwhom were Medical Officers of Health, some of whom
were medical academics, and several ofthe most active ofwhom were specialists who
needed hospital rationalization to develop generally available services. Among the
specialists (as Honigsbaum has observed) orthopaedists were conspicuous-an
obvious and important example being Harry Platt, who was active on Manchester's
Joint Hospitals Advisory Board before becoming involved, nationally, with the
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust. That one of the first acts of the Joint Board in
Manchester was the implementation ofa regional fracture scheme, and that the first
report(1939)oftheNuffieldTrustoutlinedaschemeforaunifiedaccidentservice105is
not simply an indication ofthe influence and interests ofPlatt, however. Platt's career
wastypical ofseveralcontemporarywould-bespecialistswhosimilarlymovedthrough
the small voluntary hospitals to regional hospital centres to involvement with the
organization ofthe National Health Service.106 In considering these parallel careers,
what emerges clearly is not the particular, but the general importance of the
orthopaediccase. Accidents, likecancer, were onanew frontierof"publichealth"- a
frontier that was part and parcel of the argument for rationalization and
specialization. Fromthiswiderperspective, thereports bythe BMAand the Delevigne
committees appear less as orthopaedic reports ingovernment dress, than as particular
instances of the reformist stratagems ofconsultant specialists.
Clearly, then, the campaign for segregated hospital fracture services under
orthopaedicspecialistswasaboutmuchmorethanmeetingtheneedininterwarBritain
forimproved fracture treatment. Asanemotive social issueintowhichcould bedrawn
major interest groups from outsidemedicine,'07 the fracture issueprovided one ofthe
most visible and compelling of the arguments for technical expertise-an argument
that could and was used to legitimate the reform ofhospitals and the medical services
as awhole. In this sense, thefracturemovement didindeed "sanctify acause". It is not
surprising, therefore, that the investigation of the fracture movement illuminates
various key aspects in the transformation to the hospital system of mid-twentieth-
century Britain.
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